Context
A large police force in the south of England commissioned fire risk assessments across an estate spanning custody suites, specialist operational facilities and residential training sites — three building types that don't share a single normal-use assumption. Custody suites in particular sit outside the usual means-of-escape model: detained persons cannot self-evacuate, so any judgement about adequate escape provision has to be built around staff-dependent evacuation rather than occupants moving themselves to a place of safety.
The brief
The force needed non-intrusive fire risk assessments across the estate, carried out to one consistent methodology so custody, operational and residential training sites could be judged against the same standard and reported through the same governance route — rather than each building type accumulating its own local basis for compliance.
Our approach
Apex assessed the estate under PAS 79 methodology throughout, non-intrusive at every site, so custody suites, specialist operational facilities and residential training sites were all measured against the same standard rather than a use-specific variant.
Custody suites were assessed on the basis that detained persons cannot self-evacuate: means of escape, compartmentation and fire detection were judged against staff-dependent evacuation, not the general assumption that occupants can move themselves to a place of safety. That distinction changes what an adequate response looks like — from travel distances to how a fire is expected to be managed and detainees moved before self-evacuation could ever be an option.
The programme ran over 12 months and was extended by three months to work around the scheduling and access constraints of live operational and secure sites, without relaxing the non-intrusive PAS 79 methodology applied throughout.
Outcome
The force ended the programme with a single, consistent fire compliance standard applied across its estate — custody suites, specialist operational facilities and residential training sites assessed and reported the same way, rather than each carrying its own separate basis for compliance.
What a duty holder can take from this
An estate that mixes sleeping-risk-adjacent secure environments with operational and residential-training buildings can't be assessed piecemeal without losing a defensible, comparable position across the estate. Custody suites need means-of-escape judgements built around staff-dependent evacuation, not the general occupant-movement assumptions that underpin most FRAs. Applying one methodology without exception across very different building types is what lets a public-sector duty holder show a single coherent compliance position rather than a patchwork of local answers.